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Neither the income tax of 1913, nor that of 1916, contained any
provisions with reference to "invested capital." Under these acts,
the tax upon corporations, like that upon individuals, was determined
by the amount of the net income without regard to its relation to
capital. Under the Excess Profits Tax Act of 1917,1 conceived in part
at least like the corporation, excise tax of 19o9, as a tax upon doing
business, the partial exemption from the extra tax burden and the
graduation of its amount are based upon the invested capital of the
enterprise. By the Act of 1918,2 the "war excess profits tax" was
made to apply to corporations only, and as to them there was continued
the use of invested capital as a factor in determining the tax.
So far as revenue yield was concerned, a sufficiently high flat tax
upon business or corporate incomes would have been as effective as
the new tax, and would have been easier to compute and to administer.
A high flat tax would, however, have borne with undue hardship on
the enterprise having an income which was but a low return upon
the investment. And it would not have reached the limit of what
was conceived to be the tax-paying ability of the enterprise enjoying,
perhaps through war conditions, a very high return upon its invest-
ment. The excess profits tax was, therefore, framed so as to exempt
a moderate return upon capital, and, to increase according to the
richness of the return upon the capital.
The amount of net income is, of course, the true increase in assets
from earnings or profits during a certain period of time. The rich-
ness of an income produced by the aid of capital is measured by the
relation of the income to the capital. Capital is no fixed and certain
thing: especially in the case of corporations, several different bases
of reckoning might have been chosen. One basis is the stock, or
stock, bonds and dther securities issued; another is the value of the
property currently employed in the business. A third artificial basis
sometimes suggested is an estimated normal ratio of investment to
gross income in a particular industry. The basis actually selected for
'Act of October 3, 1917 (referred to as the Revenue Act of 1917) tit. II,
4o Stat. L. 302.
'Act approved February 24, i919, but styled "Revenue Act of i918," tit. III,
40 Stat. L. io88.
'See Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. (i9i8) 247 U. S. 179, 38 Sup. Ct. 467; Lynch v.
Hornby (19x8) 247 U. S. 339, 38 Sup. Ct. 543.
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the 1917 act, and adhered to, after consideration, in the Act of 1918
(more particularly discussed in this article), is that of the cash or
equivalent of cash put into the business for stock or left in the business
through the accumulation of income. This statutory "invested capital"
is subject to certain qualifications, such as that where good will and
trade-marks and the like (and under the 1918 act, patents) were paid
in for stock, the value so contributed may not be allowed beyond a
sum exceeding a certain percentage of the par value of the stock, and
the qualification that the earnings of the current taxable year cannot
be included. Capital secured by borrowing may not be included but
the interest upon the obligations is deductible as an expense in
determining the net income.
The cash-paid-in-basis for reckoning capital was by no means the
most generous basis which might have been chosen. It is probable,
however, that had Congress adopted a more liberal basis it would have
counteracted the beneficial effect by making the rates of tax higher,
for the tax was worked out so as to yield a definitely estimated amount
of revenue. 4 The distinctive feature of the excess profits tax is not so
much its amount, but the novel distribution of the tax between different
taxpayers. The method adopted in the statute operates to produce
for enterprises similarly circumstanced in every respect, except that
of cash or cash value paid or left in against stock, tax burdens which
are materially different. Thus, if corporation A and corporation B
are both engaged in the same line of business, each employing property
of the same value and producing the same net return, the tax of A
may be higher than that of B if: (a) a substantial part of the capital
of A was procured through the issue of. bonds while all the capital
of B was procured through stock; or (b) A acquired its property
some time before B, when the cost of such property was materially
less than the cost prevailing when B made its acquisition;. or (c) A
manages to carry on its business on materially less capital than B,
which may have capital invested in some property not returning much
income. These instances may be multiplied.
By the so-called relief sections a special method of assessment is
provided for particularly difficult cases. These cases are those in
which there is lack of adequate data for determing invested capital,
or in which upon application the commissioner of internal revenue
finds that owing to abnormal conditions affecting the capital or income
the tax if assessed under the primary provisions of the act, would be
grossly disproportionate to that upon "representative" corporations
engaged in like business. In such cases the tax is to be an amount
'Report of Senate Committee on Finance No. 617 (December, igig) 1-4-
showing that the 1918 Revenue Act as reported was framed as closely as possible
to yield $6,ooo,oooooo, and that of this amount the war excess profits tax was
expected to yield $2Aooooooo and the income tax $2.2o7,oao,ooo.
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which bears the same ratio to the net income of the taxpayer as that
of representative corporations bears to their net income. The relief
section of the I9M7 act was less full in its terms than that of the i918
act but was found to warrant substantially the same relief as that
provided for in the later act.
Outstanding legal questions as to this new use of invested capital
as a tax factor are: (i) whether a. method of assessment involving
unlike taxes upon taxpayers similarly circumstanced, except as to
statutory invested capital; and (2) 'whether a method of relief for
hard cases resting upon no certain rule and involving the exercise of
discretion by administrative officers, are constitutional. Other ques-
tions as to the acts might be discussed, but these are perhaps the
principal ones.5 The decided cases appear to disclose little probability
that the statute will be upset on either ground. The remedy for the
inequalities of the law is legislative, rather than judicial.
The only provision which might operate to limit the power of
Congress in prescribing a method of apportionment like that involved is
the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.' Although there is as yet
no decision to that effect, the "due process" requirement there imposed
must be held applicable to the taxing power, and would render invalid
a basis of tax operating to produce purely arbitrary discrimination in
the amounts assessed upon different taxpayers.
The power of Congress to levy taxes, without action by the states,
is "the one great power upon which the whole national fabric is based"
and it has been jealously guarded by the courts. Important aspects
of it are set forth in the often quoted statement of Chief Justice Chase:
'Another such question is whether the special war excess profits tax could
be made, as it was by the Revenue Act of 1918, to apply solely to corporations.
The decisions appear to indicate that this separate classification of corporations
is proper. See elaborate note in 60 L. R. A. 33-6o; also Flint v. Stone Tracy
Co. (I9II) 220 U. S. io7, 31 Sup. Ct. 342; Coulter v. Louisville & N. R. R.
(i9o5) i96 U. S. 599, 25 Sup. Ct. 342; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Indiana
(1897) 165 U. S. 304, 17 Sup. Ct. 345. A further-question is whether the act
of i918 is objectionable in that it was not passed until after the close of the
year on the basis of which the tax was assessed. The decisions indicate that
no constitutional limitation is violated by using as the standard of the tax,
income for a period elapsed at the time of the passage of the act.. Brushaber v.
Union Pacific Ry. (1916) 240 U. S. I, 36 Sup. Ct. 236; Stockdale v'. Insurance
Co. (1873, U. S.) 20 Wall. 323, 331: "The right of Congress to have imposed
this tax by'a new statute, although the measure of it was governed by the
income of the past year, cannot be doubted; much less can it be doubted that
it could impose such a tax on the income of the current year, though part of
that year had elapsed when the statute was passed." As to the treatment of
personal service "corporations," cf. Collector v. Hubbard (i87o, U. S.) 12
Wall. i.
"'No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty or property, without
due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use without
just compensation." U. S. Constitution, Art. V.
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"It is true that the power of Congress to tax is a very extensive
power. It is given in the Constitution, with only one exception and
only two qualifications. Congress cannot tax exports, and it must
impose direct taxes by the rule of apportionment, and indirect taxes
by the rule of uniformity. Thus limited, and thus only, it reaches
every subject, and may be exercised at discretion."I
Congress may select at discretion the subjects of taxation: It may
tax the privilege of manufacturing in some lines and not in others ;8
it may tax the use of foreign-built yachts and not that of domestic
yachts ;9 it may, through stamps or otherwise, tax some commercial
transactions and not others.10 It exercises a concurrent power to tax
with that of the states, and may tax the exercise of rights and privi-
leges created by the states1 There is no limit as to the amount of tax
which may be imposed-the tax may indeed be destructive.:2 Congress
has very wide discretion as to the manner of tax: it may tax a privilege
according to the special capacity of the taxpayer to exercise it, rather
than according to the extent of its actual exercise by him3' In tax-
'License Tax Cases (1866, U. S.) 5 Wall. 462, 471. "The Congress shall
have Power To Lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay
the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the
United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout
the United States." U. S. Constitution, Art. i, sec. 8,
"No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to
the Census or Enumeration hereinbefore directed to be taken.
"No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State." Ibid.,
sec. 9.
8 Cornell v. Coyne (1904) 192 U. S. 418, 24 Sup. Ct. 383; Spreckels Sugar
Refining Co. v. McClain (x9o4) 192 U. S. 397, 24 Sup. Ct. 376.
.Billings v. United States (1914) 232 U. S. 261, 34 Sup. Ct. 421.
"'Nicol v. Ames (1899) 173 U. S. 509, i9 Sup. Ct. 522; Treat v. White (Igoi)
i8I U. S. 264, 2I Sup. Ct. 6II.
'Knowlton v. Moore (i9oo) 178 U. S. 4r. 20 Sup. Ct. 747, a leading case,
sustaining a federal graduated tax on inheritances.
SMcCray v. United States (I9O4) I95 U. S. 27, 24 Sup. Ct. 767-Oleomargarine
act imposing a tax of one-fourth of one per cent. on oleomargarine not artificially
colored any shade of yellow, and a tax of ten cents a pound on oleomargarine
so colored, sustained; the court holding that it is not its province to go
into the motives or purposes of Congress in passing the act. "As quite recently
pointed out by this court in Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41, 6o, the often-
quoted statement of Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland, that
the power to tax is the power to destroy, affords no support whatever to the
proposition that where there is a lawful-power to impose a tax its imposition
may be treated as without the power because of the destructive effect of thke
exertion of the authority." Ibid., 56. Veazie Bank v. Fentio. (1869, U. S.)
8 Wall. 533: prohibitive tax on state bank notes sustained. Pacific Insurance
Company v. Soule (1868, U. S.) 7 Wall. 433.
"8 United States v. Singer (1872, U. S.) I5 Wall. i, sustaining liquor
manufacturing tax based on manufacturing capacity of the distillery; Ander-
son v. The Forty-Two Broadway Co. (1915) 239 U. S. 69, 36 Sup. Ct. 1T,
sustaining provision of I909 Corporation Excise Tax law limiting amount of
interest which could be deducted in computing income subject to tax; Stanton
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ing inheritances it may provide that the rate of tax shall increase with
the amount of the inheritance ;1, and in taxing incomes it may also
prescribe progressive rates.15
A few taxes sought to be imposed have been held to be invalid
because in violation of the express limitations of the Constitution.
Thus burdens upon exports, although light and fairly remote, have
not been sanctioned,18 although no objection was found to the applica-
tion of a general income tax to income from exportation. 17  No tax
has been invalidated because of lack of uniformity, as that require-
ment as to indirect taxes has been held to mean only that the tax
must operate with geographical uniformity throughout the United
States, and not with "intrinsic uniformity" with reference to the
incidence of the tax upon different taxpayers.' 8 The only tax invali-
dated as being a direct tax, not apportioned between the states accord-
ing to population, was, until March 8, 192o, the 1894 income tax, in the
Pollock case.'" The holding in this case that a tax upon the income
from real estate was in the nature of a direct tax, Was met by the
Sixteenth Amendment, 0 authorizing Congress "to tax incomes from
whatever source derived, without apportionment." This Amendment,
as the Supreme Court has shown, is not the source of the power of
Congress to tax incomes. It merely removes a disability in taxing
a certain kind of income.21 One implied exception to the power to
v. Baltic Mining Co. (1916) 240 U. S. 103, 36 Sup. Ct. 278, 1913 Income Tax
law held not unconstitutional in its application to Mining Company by reason
of the alleged limitation of the depletion allowance below allo wance necessary
for return of capital value. Cf. Stratton's Independence v. Howbert (913)
231 U. S. 399, 34 Suii. Ct. 136.
"Knowlton v. Moore, supra.
"Brushaber v. Union Pacific Ry., supra.
"Fairbanks v. United States (19ol) 181 U. S. 283, 21 Sup. Ct. 648, stamp
tax on export bill of lading held equivalent to a tax on articles embraced in
the bill and hence a burden on exports. United States v. Hvoslef (915) 237
U. S. I, 35 Sup. Ct. 459; Thames & Mersey Marine Insurance Co., Ltd., v.
United States (1915) 237 U. S. 19, 35 Sup. Ct. 496.
'Peck & .Co. v. Lowe (1918) 247 U. S. 165, 38 Sup. Ct. 432.
'Knowlton v. Moore, supra. The provision in sec. 8 of Art. i of the
Constitution that "all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform through-
out the United States" was urged in objection to the graduated inheritance
tax, but it was held that the uniformity required was merely a geographical
uniformity. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., supra.
'Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. (1895) 157 U. S. 429, 15 Sup. Ct.
673; (1895) 158 U. S. 6oi, 15 Sup. Ct. 766.
""The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from
whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several states, and
without regard to any census or enumeration." U. S. Constitution, Art. XVI.
'Peck & Co. v. Lowe (1918) 247 U. S. i6, 172, 38 Sup. Ct. 432, (1918)
27 YALE LAW JouaxAI., io96. "The Sixteenth Amendment, although referred
to in argument, has no real bearing and may be put out of view. As pointed
out in recent decisions, it does not extend the taxing power to new or excepted
subjects, but merely removes all odcasion, which otherwise might exist, for
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tax has also become established. Fearing the ultimate destructive
consequences of the power to tax, the Court has held that Congress
may. not tax the instrumentalities of the states, as it was the intent of
the Constitution to preserve the states
22
So vigorous has been the Court in its support of federal taxing
power that all the attacks upon taxing statutes under the Fifth Amend-
ment, upon the ground of their unequal operation, have so far failed,23
and the Court has sometimes declared that the taxing power is not
limited by the due process provision. Such is the implication of the
dictum of Chief Justice Chase. And in the McCray case in which the
Court strongly sustained the tax obviously designed through dis-
criminating burdens to stamp out the sale of artificially colored
oleomargarine, the Court said:
"Whilst undoubtedly both the Fifth and Tenth Amendments qualify,
in so far as they are applicable, all the provisions of the Constitution,
nothing in those amendments operates to take away the grant of power
to tax conferred by the Constitution upon Congress.
24
no instance is afforded from the foundation of the gov-
ernment where an act, which was within a power conferred, was
declared to be repugnant to, the Constitution, because it appeared to
the judicial mind that the particular exertion of constitutional power
was either unwise or unjust.' '25
In the foreign-built yacht tax case, the Court strikingly declared:
c . the authority to tax which is given in express terms is not
limited or restricted by the subsequent provisions of the Constitution.
or of the amendments thereto, especially the due process clause
(To hold otherwise) would result in rendering the Constitution
unconstitutional."6
an apportionment among the States of taxes laid on income, whether it be
derived from one source or another. Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. R. Co.
24o U. S. i, i7-i9; Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co. 240 U. S. 103, 112-1'3" In
Eisner v. Macomber (March 8, i92o) U. S. Sup. Ct. Oct. Term, 1919, No. 318,
a divided Court held that the provision of the 1916 act treating stock dividends
as income was invalid on the ground that they are capital and could be taxed
to the recipient only by a direct tax according to population. This relates to
the definition of income-not to the basis of apportioning a tax upon income.
=Collector v. Day (I87%, U. S.) ii Wall. 113; United States v. Baltimore &
Ohio Ry. (1872, U. S.) 7 Wall. 322; Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co.,
supra; Ambrosina v. United States (192) 187 U. S. 1, 23 Sup. Ct. i. But
as to tax on non-governmental function of a state, see South Carolina v. United
States (i9o5) gg U. S. 437, 26 Sup. Ct. iio.
' In Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., supra, the tax cases up to date of the decision
are collected in notes at the foot of pages 159 and i6o. Cases since the Stone
Tracy decision, sustaining federal taxing acts against the claims of want of
due process are: Brushaber v. Union Pacific Co., supra; Stanton v. Baltic
Mining Co., supra; Dodge v. Osborne (i916) 24o U. S. 1i8, 36 Sup. Ct. 275;
Lynch v. Hornby, supra.
"McCray v. United States, supra, 61. 2 Ibid., 54.
'Billings v. United States, supra, 282, 283.
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It has commonly been urged by counsel as to any new and unusual
tax, particularly when it could be shown that it did not operate uni-
formly as to all taxpayers, that it was void under the amendment as
resulting in deprivation of property without due process.27 Yet as
lately as in the Brushaber decision, sustaining the 1913 income tax,
Chief Justice White said:
"So far as the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment is relied
upon, it suffices to say that there is no basis for such reliance since
it is equally well settled that such clause is not a limitation upon the
taxing power conferred upon Congress by the Constitution; in other
words, that the Constitution does not conflict with itself by con-
ferring upon the one hand a taxing power and taking the same power
away on the other by the limitations of the due process clause." 2
It can hardly be doubted, however, that upon this point the pro-
nouncement of the Court is more drastic than will be its ultimate
decision. Even in the McCray case, the Court was not satisfied to
rely upon the bald proposition as to the non-application of the amend-
ment to the taxing power, but proceeded to maintain that the classifi-
cation made under the oleomargarine statute was not a palpably
unreasonable one.29  In the Billings case also, there was a defence by
the Court of the classification made by Congress, and in the Brushaber
case, following the passage above quoted, we have a qualification
characteristic of the Chief Justice:
"This doctrine would have no application in a case where although
there was a seeming exercise of the taxing power, the act complained
of was soL arbitrary as to constrain to the conclusion that it was not
the exertion of taxation but a confiscation of property.
80
Without doubt the Chief Justice would in such terms denounce a
statute whith purported, in the language of the classic moot case, to
tax red haired, men at one rate and black haired men at a lower rate.
Other judges might be less ready to rest a decision upon the ground
that what was denominated by Congress as a taxing act, was not'such
in fact. They would be likely to base their rejection of the use of
the hair test in taxations upon the simple propositions that it, lacked
that modicum of justice required under any conception of due process.31
" See cases referred to in note 23, supra.
. Brushaber v. Union Pacific Ry., supra, 24.
McCray v. United States, supra, 63. "Moreover. concede for the sake of
argument only, that even although a particular exertion of power by Congress
was not restrained by any express limitation of the Constitution, if by the
perverted exercise of such power so great an abuse was manifested as to destroy
fundamental rights which no free government could consistently violate, that
it would be the duty of the judiciary to hold such acts to be void upon the
assumption that the Constitution by necessary implication forbade them" and
argument pp. 63-64. Italics are those of the present writer.
'Brushaber v. Union Pacific Ry., supra.
'In the leading case of Loan Association v. Topeka (1873, U. S.) 20 Wall.
6. 66a. the court in holding that a statute nurnortin, to athnri7n taxatinfl
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The proposition that to hold that the amendment limits the taxing
power would be "to render the constitution unconstitutional" is the
opposite of the truth. The amendment, if it has any application at all,
can apply only to powers. An act beyond the power of the acting
government agency is no act at all; regardless of the due process
clause or any other limitation, it would fail because of the want of
power. The Court has unhesitatingly decided that the due process
limitation applies to other powers of the government, for example,
the power to regulate interstate commerce and the power to regulate
the post. 2 The power to tax, vital as it is, stands upon no higher
basis; it must be subject to the same general restraint against the
exercise of governmental power in a manner purely arbitrary. The
due process limitation conflicts with the grant of power to tax only
in the same sense that the brakes upon a locomotive conflict with the
driving wheels.
It by no means follows that the Court's judgment as to what is
arbitrary and discriminatory may be substituted for the judgment of
Congress. This is shown by the very wide discretion which the Court
has already recognized in Congress as to the form of taxing statutes.
In the Pollock case, so able a judge as Mr. Justice Field believed that
the comparatively slight graduations of the income tax then before
the Court, and the exemptions granted from it made the tax so
arbitrarily unequal as to render the tax invalid. 8 In the more recent
for other than a public purpose is void put the difficulty with the statute on
the ground that it violated one of the "limitations of such power which grow
out of the essential Vature of all free governments." Mr. Justice Clifford
dissented maintaining that the courts could not nullify an act of the legislature
"on the vague ground that they think it opposed to a general latent spirit
supposed to pervade or underlie the constitution where, neither the terms nor
the implications of the instrument disclose any such restriction." To-day
judges would be more likely to base constitutional objections upon specific
provisions of the instrument than upon such ground as was properly objected
to by Justice Clifford in his dissent.
' Adair v. United States (x9o8) 2o8 U. S. I6l, 28 Sup. Ct. 277: federal
3tatute making it an offense for a carrier to discharge an employee because of
membership in a labor organization held to be void under the Fifth Amend-
ment. Delaware,. Lackawanna & W. Ry. v. United States (1913) 231 U. S.
363, 369, 24 Sup. Ct. 65: "The exercise of that power" [to regulate interstate
commerce] "is, of course, limited by the provisions of the Fifth Amendment."
See also School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty (igo2)'187 U. S. 94, 23
Sup. Ct 33; Public Clearing House v. Coyne (9o4) 194 U. S. 497, 24 Sup. Ct.
789; Gulf etc. Railway v. Ellis (1897) z65 U. S. xo 17 Sup. Ct. 255.
'Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., supra, 596, 597. In stating his
objections to the tax which exempted those receiving incomes less than $4,ooo,
the learned Justice referred to the Englishl Income Tax Statute of 16gi, which
taxed Protestants a certain rate, Catholics as a class, double the rate of
Protestants, and Jews at another and separate rate and said: "The inherent
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cases, the exemptions from the tax and the far more- marked gradua-
tion of the rates did not win the adverse vote of a single judge.8"
The latitude accorded to the legislative body is even more strongly
shown by the decisions of the courts with reference to the state taxing
acts sought to be invalidated under the equal protection or due process
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment-provisions closely similar in
their scope to the federal restrictions of the Fifth Amendment. In
sustaining a state statute, under which bonds were taxed at their face
value instead of at their actual value, the Court declared that "dear
and hostile discriminations against particular persons and classes,
especially such as are of an unusual character, unknown to the practice
of our governments," might be obnoxious under the Fourteenth
Amendment, but with refererice to the wide discretion of the legislature
in the exercise of the state taxing power, said:
"It may impose different specific taxes upon different trades and pro-
fessions, and may vary the rates of excise upon various products; it
may tax real estate and personal property in a different manner; it
may tax visible property only, and not tax securities for payment of
money; it may allow deductions for indebtedness, or not allow them.135
In the leading case sustaining a classification of a graduated state
inheritance tax law, the Court said as to the rule of equality:
"The rule prescribes no rigid equality and permits to the discretion
and wisdom of the State a wide latitude."8 6
In this case, Mr. Justice Brewer in dissenting, maintained that the
classification of inheritances was purely arbitrary because based upon
wealth and was intentionally made unequal. This dissent left no
imprint upon the subsequent course of decisions87
In the latest case upon this point, the Court declared:
"In making classification, which has been uniformly held to be
within the power of the state, inequalities necessarily arise for some
classes are reached, and others omitted, but this 'has never been held
to render such statutes unconstitutional. . . . In order to invalidate
and fundamental nature and character of a tax is that of a- contribution to
the support of the government, levied upon the principle of equal and uniform
apportionment among the persons taxed, and any other exaction does not
come within the legal definition of a tax" (p. 599).
"See note 15, supra; Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., supra.
'Bell's Gap Railroad Co. v. Pennsylvania (189o) 134 U. S. 232, 237, 10
Sup. Ct. 533.
" Magoun v. Illinois Trust and Savings Bank (1898) 170 U. S. 283, 293, i8
Sup. Ct. 594.
Campbell v. California (igO6) 200 U. S. 87, 26 Sup. Ct. 182; Beers v. Glynn
(1909) 211 U. S. 477, 29 Sup. Ct. 186.
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this tax it must be held that the difference in the manner of assessing
the transmission of property by testators or intestates, as between
resident and non-resident decedents,, is so wholly arbitrary and
unreasonable as to be beyond the legitimate authority of the state."881
In the decisions as to state statutes, we have, however, at least two
instances in which the manner chosen for the levy of tax was so
arbitrary as to be held invalid. In the latest of these decisions, invali-
dating a palpably unreasonable manner of assessing on the abutters
the cost of paving, Mr. Justice Holmes said:
"The differences were not based upon any consideration of differ-
ence in the benefits conferred but were established mechanically in
obedience to the criteria that the charter directed to be applied. The
defendants' case is not an incidental result of a rule that as a whole
and on the average may be expected to work well, but as an ordinance
that is a farrago of irrational irregularities throughout."39
Notwithstanding the recognized latitude which Congress enjoys in
choosing methods of tax, the Court will undoubtedly hold that Congress
like a state legislature, may not take property under a "farrago of
irrational irregularities."
There are those who would unhesitatingly characterize the invested
capital provisions as any sort of a "farrago." This charge might be
entitled to weight in Congress but is not likely to be sustained to the
satisfaction of the judicial mind.
Congress sought through the invested capital concept to set a
standard by which a moderate return could be protected from excessive
levy, and the, rate increased accordingly to the ability of the taxpayer
to respond. The problem here involved was practical rather than legal.
"Taxation is eminently practical," as the Court has remarked, and
the validity of a tax law is not to be decided "with reference to those
theoretical and abstract ideas whose correctness is the subject of
dispute and contradiction among those who are experts in the science
of political economy." 40 As to a method of taxation, like any "classi-
fication," the question is whether there is any reasonable ground for
it or whether it is simply arbitrary. The decided cases show that the
presumption that each act of Congress is valid, is applied with special
readiness to revenue acts and that the Court, even without the persua-
'Maxwell v. Bugbee (1919) 40 Sup. Ct. 2. Upon the specific point decided
in this case-that the amount of inheritance tax upon property of a non-
resident decedent within the state may be compared by first determining what
the tax would .be if the entire estate were within the State and then taking
such portion of this amount as the property within the State bears to the total
estate-four of the Justices dissenting. See (1920) 29 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 464.
'Gast Realty Co. v. Schneider Granite Co. (I916) 240 U. S. 55, 59, 36 Sup.
Ct. 254.
' Nicol v. Ames (1899) 173 U. S. 5o9, 516, i9 Sup. Ct. 522.
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sive effect of the imperative need for war revenue, would not be likely
to declare invalid a taxing act framed with anything like reasonable
regard to its just incidence.
In seeking to overthrow under the Fifth Amendment a basis
adopted by Congress for that purpose, it is by no means sufficient to
show that under it some taxpayers pay not only more but at a higher
rate than others. That broad objection is disposed of by the cases
sustaining the graduated inheritance taxes and more directly by the
decisions sustaining the graduated income tax.4 1 What must be shown
is that the basis for applying the higher rate to one taxpayer rather
than another is entirely without logical foundation.
That the amount of capital paid into an enterprise for stock,
together with the earnings or profits voluntarily left in by the stock-
holders, has some bearing* upon the question of what return is to be
exempted from special tax and how progressive rates may be applied,
cannot be denied. We are not dealing here with any question of a
taking of property either directly or through the unreasonable reduc-
tion of the return upon it. When that question is involved, as in the
eminent domain or rate cases, the capital basis to be adopted is the
fair value of the property at the time of the taking, and in determining
that question many elements aside from the cost of the investment
must be taken into account.42 But no property and no rate of return
is protected from the levy of tax; taking cases have no bearing upon
the validity of a tax law. Nor are we considering a question of deter-
mining capital for the purpose of ascertaining income. In computing
the profit from the sale of property, a taxpayer is entitled to deduct
the fair value of his property, at least at the date when the taxing law
became operative.43 The question here, however, is not one of income
determination but the very different question of a 'basis for, distributing
tax against income. The cash which the stockholders paid or left in
to be employed in the business furnishes at least one basis for measur-
ing the richness of the income from the business and the idea of
making the rate of tax increase according to the richness of the income
is the plan of the progressive rates for individual incomes which the
court has already approved. Unlike individual incomes, corporate
incomes cannot be justly rated merely according to their amount, but
only according to their relation to some measure of capital.
Even though the cash paid in is a relevant factor in rating corporate
incbmes, its use for this purpose might be regarded as arbitrary if there
is available some other basis which is equally practicable and mani-
festly more just. No such other basis has as yet been worked out.
'See note x5, supra.
'Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States (1893) 148 U. S. 312, 13
Sup. St. 622; Smyth v. Ames (1898) 169 U. S. 466, x8 Sup. Ct. 418.
'Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., supra; Lynch v. Turrish (1918) 247 U. S. 2r,
38 Sup. Ct. 537.
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Few would venture to claim this merit for the simple basis of the par
value of stock or other securities issued. 'Stock all too frequently
represents aspirations rather than assets. It has been widely urged
that property secured through borrowing, particularly long term bor-
rowing, should have been included in invested capital. It is difficult,
however, to say that Congress had to ignore the possibility which would
thus have been opened up of artificially increasing capital, and that
there is no reasonable ground for distinguishing between funds fur-
nished by stockholders and those furnished by debt holders, particularly
when the interest on the debt is made deductible'as an expense. If
the value of the property employed in the business had been made the
measure, appraisals and interminable investigation would have been
needed in the case of every assessment as the rate cases have abundantly
shown. Great administrative difficulty would also have been involved
by a provision that invested capital should in all cases be some fixed
percentage of gross to net income, the percentage to be determined for
each particular industry. If it be urged that Congress should not
have adopted any one definite basis for determining invested capital,
but should have provided that all possible bases should have been
taken into account, the Court would doubtless take the view that in
order to make the statute workable, it was necessary to prescribe some
single and fairly definite standard.
If the basis adopted has relation to the issue, if it is not one which
must be rejected by most fair minds in favor of some other practicable
basis, the fact that the basis does result in discrimination as between
taxpayers is not sufficient for its invalidation. Such injustice as it
causes is likely to be regarded as incidental rather than as fundamental.
By as early an authority as Plato, it was remarked,
"When there is an income-tax, the just man will pay more and the
unjust less on the same amount of income."44
It has always been recognized that equality in the distribution of tax
burdens could not be obtained. In considering the graduated inheri-
tance tax, the Court said:
"The rule of equality permits many practical inequalities. . .
In a classification for governmental purposes there cannot be an exact
exclusion or inclusion of persons and things."' 5
In sustaining the corporation excise tax of i909, Chief Justice Fuller
remarked:
"The tax must be measured by some standard, and none can be
chosen which will operate with absolute justice and equality upon all
corporations."46
"Plato's Republic (Jowetts' 3d ed. 1888) 21.
"Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank, supra, 296.
'Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., supra, 65.
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Of the state taxing power, the Court recently said:
"Absolute equality is impracticable.in taxation and is not required
by the equal protection clause and inequalities that result not from
hostile discrimination, but occasionally and incidentally in the appli-
cation of a system that is not arbitrary in its classification, are not
sufficient to defeat the tax."47
War tax 'burdens are heavy, and the inequalities inherent in all
plans of taxation are bound to be accentuated in war tax measures.
In fields other than taxation the Court has been inclined to recognize
the power of the legislature to meet new social conditions by measures
which lessen the sphere of individual liberty as conceived in an earlier
day. 8 In a similar way the latitude permitted to Congress in taxation
is likely to be extended under the pressure of new conditions at the
further expense of equality in the treatment of individual taxpayers.
The Bench which sustained the Selective Draft Law is not likely to
have very serious difficulty with the discrimination involved in the
revenue measures which backed up the draft.
Under the relief sections, the taxpayer entitled to relief because of
some abnormal condition, is to have his tax determined not according
to his invested capital, but so as to "bear the same ratio to the net
income of the taxpayer as the average tax of representative corpora-
tions bear to their net income." The constitutional objection to this
remedial provision would be not that the statute is too rigid, but that
it is too flexible; that as to cases falling within the relief clause,
Congress has not legislated, but has delegated its power to adminis-
trative officers. Agairist any delegation might be urged the declaration
of Hamilton, quoted by Mr. Justice Field in his dissent in the Pollock
case:
"The genius of liberty reprobates every thing arbitrary or discre-
tionary in taxation. It exacts that every man, by a definite and general
rule, should know what proportion of his property the State
demands. ' '49
"Maxwell v. Bugbee, supra.
'"Cf. Muller v. Oregon (I9O8) 208 U. S. 412, 28 Sup. Ct. 324 with Lochner v.
New York (19o5) 198 U. S. 45, 25 Sup. Ct. 539; and Wilson v. New (917) 243
U. S. 332, 37 Sup. Ct. 298, (917) 26 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 496 with Adair v.
United States (I9O8) 208 U. S. 161; also see Arizona Copper Co. v. Hammer
(1919) 39 Sup, Ct. 553, (1919) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 225.
'(i895) 157 U. S. 429, 596, i6 Sup. Ct. 673. See also opinion per Matthews, J.,
in Yick Wo v. Hopkins (I886) 118 U. S. 356, 369, 6 Sup. Ct. io64. "When we
consider the nature and theory of our institutions of government, the principles
upon which they are supposed to rest, and review the history of their develop-
ment, we are constrained to conclude that they do not mean to leave room for
the play and action of purely personal and arbitrary power."
44
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There is in the statute a difficult but reasonably clear rule for all
but abnormal cases, but a taxpayer believing himself entitled to relief
because of exceptionally harsh operation of the primary provisions
of the act cannot by any specific provision in the statute determine
whether he is so entitled or what relief would be. The leaving of these
questions to be determined without a mathematical formula and in
the first instance by the commissioner of internal revenue, does not
appear however to involve any unconstitutional delegation of the
power of Congress.
The power to tax is conferred by the Constitution upon Congress,
and no other agency. In any polity of English origin, this power
belongs historically to the Legislature. The contest between Parlia-
ment and the Crown over the power of taxation ended in defeat for
the executive. It was not likely that the men of the colonies, who
rested their right of revolution so largely upon the wrong of taxation
without representation, would vest the taxing power elsewhere than
in the most numerous and direct representatives of the people. Yet the
power with reference to taxation which was conferred upon Congress
was legislative power.50 Congress is not called upon to exercise any
function with reference to it which is not a legislative function.
Even in England where there was no doctrine as to the necessary
separation of powers, the power exercised over taxation exercised by
Parliament was general rather than specific. Any idea that a tax had
to be so levied that the individual could determine the amount which
he was called upon to pay by a simple mathematical process is possibly
a result of a misunderstanding of Coke's Second Institute.
"The values of merchandise for which the subsidy of poundage is
paid do appear in a book of rates in print, whereby the merchant
knows what he has to pay."2
51
This simply means that there was a published rate of ad valorem taxes.
Parliament preserved the right to say what percentage of property
should be taken for revenue, but the value at which property should
be assessed, and the settlement of disputes arising from claims that
the rate levied was excessive for the property, were always executive
and judicial functions. 52
Unlike some of the state constitutions, the federal Constitution
contains no prohibition of the delegation of power from one branch
to another. It is clear, of course, that for want of authority no such
delegation would be sustained, notwithstanding the absence of a pro-
U. S. Constitution, Art. I, sec. i.
Coke's Second Institute, *76.
"Magna Charta, ch. 38; Case of Ship-Money (1637) 3 How. St. Tr. 825; 1
Thayer, Cases on Constitutional Law (x895) 17.
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hibition.53 But so long as it can be said that all that is left by Congress
to administrative officers is the determination of how a taxing provi-
sion applies to a particular state of facts, no delegation is involved.
The distinction between delegation of power and mere provision
for practical administration is well shown by the cases as to state tax-
ing acts. A state legislature may not delegate the power to tax except
to elected representatives of the people, granted by it jurisdiction in
a certain subdivision of the state.5 ' The legislature may, however,
give to administrative officers tax functions involving the exercise of
much discretion. The making of the customary valuations of real or
personal property of course involves discretion, but such authority has
been exercised by administrative officers from the beginning. A statute
giving a board of equalization the power to determine the fair cash
value of the capital stock of a railway, over and upon its tangible
property, does not involve any delegation even though there is involved
the establishment by the board of rules and principles for determining
intangible values.5 5 Assessors may determine what lands are "spe-
cially benefited" by an improvement and assess them accordingly.5"
But a statute giving a state board power to increase the tax rates pre-
scribed by the legislature in order to meet deficiencies in collection of
taxes is bad.5
This general line of distinction has been many times affirmed by the
Supreme Court in passing upon Acts of Congress.58 Thus under the
'See clear statement of Miller, J, speaking for the Court in Kilbourn- v.
Thompson (188o) 103 U. S. 168. Chief Justice Marshall in Wayman v.
Southard (1825, U. S.) io Wheat 1, 42, in considering the authority of courts to
rules, declared: "It will not be contended, that.Congress can delegate to the Courts,
or to any other tribunals, powers which are strictly and exclusively legislative.
But Congress may certainly delegate to others, powers which the legislature
may rightfully exercise itself. . . . The line has not been exactly drawn
which separates those important subjects, which must be entirely regulated by
the legislature itself, from those of less interest, in which a general provision
may be made, and power to those who are to act under such general provision,
to fill up the details."
Vallelly v. Commissioners (19o7) 16 N. D. 25, xi N. W. 615; Bradley v.
Richmond (1913) 227 U. S. 477, 33 Sup. Ct. 318; State ex rel. Howe v.
DesMoines (1897). I03 Iowa, 76, 72 N. W. 639; State v. Sickles (1853) 24
N. J. Law 125.
" Michigan Central Ry. v. Powers (19o6) 201 U. S. 245, 26 Sup. Ct. 459;
Porter v. Rockford Ry. (1875) 76 11. 56i.
"2 Cooley, Taxation (3d ed.) x2o7; Bauman v. Ross (1897) 67 U. S. 548,
17 Sup. Ct. 966.
"Houghton v. Austin (1874) 47 Calif. 646.
" Miller v. Mayor of New York (1883) 109 U. S. 385, 3 Sup. Ct. 228.
Congress may delegate to the Secretary of War the function of determining
whether a bridge constitutes an obstruction of navigation. Union Bridge Co.
v. United States (19o7) 204 U. S. 364, 27 Sup. Ct. 367. St. Louii etc. Ry. v.
Taylor (i9o7) 210 U. S. 281, 28 Sup. Ct. 616, sustaining a statute by which it
was left to the American Railway Association to determine what should be
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Tariff Acts, the fixing of standards according to which different articles
are rated-a matter essential for the determination of the levy is
properly left to the Secretary of the Treasury. 9 A striking decision
is that sustaining a statute which left to the President power to deter-
mine when certain tariff schedules should go into effect as against a
foreign country because of the imposition by it of duties against the
United States which he might deem to be reciprocally unequal or
unreasonable in application to exports from the United States.60
Recognizing the increasing variety of the subject-matter upon
which statutes operate, and the increasing complexity of the result
sought to be achieved by statutes, the courts have gone much farther
than under the simpler conditions of an earlier period in supporting
the extensive use by the legislative arm of the more flexible executive
instrumentality.61
the height for the draw bars of railway cars, and to the Interstate Commerce
Commission to enforce this standard; Intermountain Rate Cases (1914) 234
U. S. 476, 34 Sup. Ct. 986, sustaining the statute giving power to the Interstate
Commerce Commission to fix railroad rates conforming to the general require-
ments set forth in the act; Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line (19o8) 211 U. S.
210, 29 Sup. Ct. 67, contra, overruled. Gilligan v. City of Covington, December
8, xgig, advance opinions page 8o. See also Pound, Justice According to Law
(1914) 14 CoL. L. REv. 15; also an excellent discussion by Professor Green
Separation of Governmental Powers (1920) 29 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 369.
' United States.v. American Express Co. (19io, C. C. Mass.) 177 Fed. 735,
Butterfield v. Stranahan (19o4) 192 U. S. 470, 24 Sup. Ct. 349.
"'Field-v. Clark (1892) 143 U. S. 649, 12 Sup, Ct. 495.
' United States v. Grimaud (igro) 216 U. S. 614, 30 Sup. Ct. 576; United
States v. Grimaud (911) 220 U. S. 5o6, 31 Sup. Ct. 48o. These two decisions in
the same case strikingly indicate the present tendency of the Court. The case
came up on demurrers to an indictment for grazing sheep on a Government
forest reserve without a permit as required by rules prescribed by the Secre-
tary of Agriculture. The statute charged this officer with the protection of
these reserves, authorized him to make rules and regulations to that end and
provided that violation of the regulations should- be punishable. In the first
decision, the Court affirmed a decision* of the District Court sustaining the
demurrers on the ground that the rules violated rested upon an attempted
delegation of power of Congress. On a petition for rehearing, the new case
was reargued before a bench containing three new Justices (Hughes, Van
Devanter and Lamar, vice Fuller, Brewer and Moody), and in the second
decision, the District Court was overruled. Lamar, J., expressing the unanimous
opinion of the Court, said:
"In the nature of things it was impracticable for Congress to provide general
regulations for these various and varying details of management. Each reser-
vation had its peculiar and special features; and in authorizing the Secretary
of Agriculture to meet these local conditions Congress was merely conferring
administrative functions upon an agent and not delegating to him legislative
power." For a state decision see Moers v. Reading (1853) 21 Pa. I88, 202.
"Half the statutes on our books are in the alternative, depending on the dis-
cretion of some person or persons to whom is confided the duty of determining
whether the propler occasion exists for executing them. But it cannot be said
that the exercise of such a discretion is the making of the law."
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For a long time a large discretion to deal with special cases has
been lodged in administrative officers, under federal taxing acts; thus
the commissioner of internal revenue has long exercised the power to
determine whether any tax has been illegally assessed 82 and more
particularly the commissioner and the Secretary of the Treasury
have exercised the power to compromise taxes assessed.68 While there
has been some difference of opinion among the United States Attorneys
General as to whether, under this power, a compromise could be made
on other than fiscal considerations, the prevailing view appears to be
that in making a compromise, discretion may be exercised on any
grounds that seem relevant. 6' Administration of the relief provisions
in question involves less broad exercises of discretion than the com-
promise power. Under these sections thefe is a fairly definite guide
as to the result to be obtained-the tax on the particular corporation
having abnormal capital or income is to be adjusted as closely as
possible to the tax upon corporations found to be similar in essential
respects other than the abnormality. Clearly also this is a little more
discretionary than the fixing of the standard for products under tariff
acts or the making of valuations under all taxing acts.
An answer to the objection that the relief clause confers upon the
Commissioner arbitrary power is that his action is not final. His
'U. S. Rev. St. sec. 3220; Cary v. Curtis (1845, U. S.) 3 How. 236; Curtis
v. Fiedler (1862, U. S.) 2 Black 461; Arnson v. Murphy (1883) 1o9 U. S.
238, 240, 3 Sup. Ct. 184; see also In re Fasseti (1892) 142 U. S. 479, 12 Sup. Ct
295; Passavant v. United States (x893) 148 U. S. 214, 13 Sup. Ct. 572.
'U. S. Rev..St. sec. 3229. "The Commissioner of Internal Revenue, with
the advice and consent of the Secretary of the Treasury, may compromise any
civil or criminal case arising under the internal-revenue laws instead of com-
mencing suit thereon; and, with the advice and consent of the said Secretary
and the recommendation of the Attorney General, he may compromise any
such case aftbr a suit thereon has been commenced."
"In 17 Opinions, Attorney General (i88i) 213, 216 Attorney General Mac-
Veagh ruled that in considering any compromise under sec. 3229, or sec. 3469,
the Secretary of the Treasury while "not at liberty to act from motives merely
of compassion and charity" was at liberty "to consider not only pecuniary
interests of the Treasury, but also general considerations of justice and equity
and of public 11olicy." To the same effect se6 an opinion of Attorney General
Bonajarte, 26 Opinions, Attorney General (i97) 282, as to compromise of
claims against solvent tax-payers arising out of violations of the oleomargarine
statute; also 29 Opinions, Attorney General (1911) 217, opinion of Solicitor
General Lehman, approved by Attorney General Wickersham. And sustaining
compromise on general grounds of penalties established under internal revenue
laws, see recent opinion of Attorney General Palmer, Corporation Trust Com-
pany, Income Tax Service (i92o) par. i929 f. But see opinion Attorney Gen-
eral Devens, I6 Opinions, Attorney General (1879) 248, to the effect that there
may not be compromised "a tax lawfully assessed upon and due from a solvent
person or corporation"; and as to restriction of the power of compromise
under sec. 3469, see (I879) 16 ibid., 259, 617; (1894) 21 ibid., 50; (i895)
ibid., 204; (igoo) 23 ibid., r8; (r9o2) ibid., 631; (9o4) 27 ibid.,'24I; (gii)
29 ibid., 149.
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assessments are in every case subject to judicial review. A taxpayer
may be compelled to pay any tax assessed under the relief or any other
provision, but he has the remedy of suing in the courts of the United
States to recover back the amount believed to have been illegally
assessed, after refusal or failure of the Commissioner to refund it
upon application.65 Prompt collection of the revenue is essential and
a provision for preliminary administrative determination as to the
application of the revenue law to the case of each taxpayer is reason-
able, and does not subject the taxpayer to discretionary power.88 The
rule to be followed by the Commissioner in making relief assessments
under the ruling section is fully as definite as many rules worked out
by the courts for their own guidance.
There are many objections to the plan of the excess profits tax. To
place the heaviest rate of tax, especially in times of peace, upon the most
successful concerns is to penalize efficiency. The effort to shift this
heavy but somewhat uncertain tax is a factor in the increase of prices;
and may have resulted in a greater increase than would have been
caused by a simpler and more uniform tax. This method of tax
requires the exercise of inquisitorial powers, involves much delay and
uncertainty and consumes effort of taxpayers which might otherwise
be productively employed. Theoretically at least none of these con-
siderations has any bearing upon the constitutional validity of the tax.
If the courts cannot be convinced that the plan adopted by Congress
involves discrimination that is merely wanton they cannot stay its
operation. There is little likelihood that the court will conclude that
the discrimination involved in the excess profits tax is hostile or
arbitrary. It is to Congress rather than to the courts that the taxpayer
must look for a fairer and wiser distribution of the revenue burden.
U. S. Rev. St. sec. 3226.
"Dodge v. Osborn (i916) 240 U. S. 1iS, 39 SuP. Ct. 275.
